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ABSTRACT 
Human users form coalitions to solve complex tasks and earn 
rewards.  Examples of such coalition formation can be found in 
the military, education, and business domains.  Multiagent coali-
tion formation techniques cannot be readily used to form human 
coalitions due to the unique aspects of the human coalition forma-
tion problem, e.g., uncertainty in human user behavior and 
changes in human user behaviors due to human learning.  Thus, a 
multiagent system designed to form human coalitions has to solve 
a learning problem, that is further made difficult by the limited 
learning opportunities and usability issues (i.e., actions or deci-
sions being perceived as not useful due to loss of immediate re-
wards while the agents are learning or exploring) intrinsic to the 
human coalition formation process.  We propose and design a 
multiagent framework that distinguishes the impact of the model 
of a human user from that of the agent support for that model.  
This novelty allows an agent to (1) better compute the types of 
support it should provide to its assigned user and (2) more accu-
rately estimate the value of a coalition by its ability of (a) solving 
the current task and (b) improving the coalition members’ beha-
vior due to learning.  In our design, each agent models its envi-
ronment using a Bayesian network and forms human coalitions 
for its assigned user using a negotiation-based protocol.  Each 
coalition balances the immediate and future rewards by analyzing 
the benefits of solving tasks and facilitating human learning.  To 
evaluate the proposed framework, we have built a comprehensive 
simulation where agents support students to form coalitions in a 
collaborative learning environment.  Our results show that the 
framework is able to form successful coalitions that facilitate 
student learning while solving tasks, leading to overall better re-
wards for student coalitions. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
I.2.11 [Artificial Intelligence]: Distributed Artificial Intelligence: 
Multiagent systems, intelligent agents. 
General Terms 
Algorithms, Design, Experimentation, Human Factors. 
Keywords 
Multiagent, Coalition Formation, Human Coalition Formation, 
Computer-Supported Collaborative Learning. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Human users form coalitions to solve complex tasks and to earn 
rewards.  Examples of such coalition formation process can be 
found in the business (e.g., organizations forming coalitions to 
earn better discounts), education (e.g., students forming coalitions 
to solve problems and gain knowledge), and in the military (e.g., 
soldiers forming coalitions to complete difficult missions) do-
mains.  With the advancements in the computer and communica-
tion technologies, human coalitions now span space (members 
spread across the globe), and time (group members communicat-
ing asynchronously).  Although human coalitions are becoming 
common in various domains, achieving optimal outcome in a 
human coalition is not automatic and depends on three aspects: (1) 
the coalition structure, (2) the uncertainty in the environment, and 
(3) changes in human behavior.  The coalition structure defines 
the distribution of the human users of different skills to the coali-
tions; the uncertainty in the environment and in the human user 
behavior determines how they use those skills; and changes in 
human behavior are due to how human skills improve due to 
learning.   
Multiagent researchers have designed frameworks where agents 
take the uncertainty in the environment and the changes in other 
agents’ behavior into account and generate coalition structures.  
However, those multiagent coalition formation methods cannot be 
readily used to form human coalitions for three reasons: (1) hu-
man changes due to learning, (2) short- and long-term rewards, 
and (3) human user modeling:  
 Since humans learn, a multiagent solution for the human coali-
tion formation problem (HCFP) must consider two issues.  First, 
the skills and experience gained by a human user while working 
in a coalition can help him or her perform tasks better—and thus 
obtain higher rewards—in future coalitions.  So, the agents that 
are helping the human users form coalitions need to model their 
own human users’ as well as the other human users’ learning to 
accurately estimate the outcome of a coalition.  Second, the agents 
helping the human users form coalitions can provide support to 
the human users and exploit the human users’ learning capability 
to further improve the outcomes of a coalition.  So, while forming 
coalitions, the agents also need to contemplate the support that 
they provide to the human users to more accurately estimate the 
value of a coalition in terms of its outcome.   
 Furthermore, the rewards of a typical HCFP can be of two 
types: current-task and future-task rewards.  The complications lie 
with the future-task or the long-term rewards.  In a multiagent 
system (MAS), long-term rewards are often calculated as dis-
counted short-term rewards (e.g., [1]).  However, in a HCFP, 
long-term rewards typically depend upon factors such as the 
openness—how often the tasks and users change in the environ-
ment—and how fast or how well the human users are able to ac-
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quire new skills through learning.  So, computing long-term re-
wards in a HCFP will need to consider these factors integrally.   
 Finally, unlike conventional multiagent systems, the actors of 
the human coalition formation problem are human users (not 
agents).  The implication is that the actors in the human coalition 
formation problem may not always behave rationally or consis-
tently.  So, a MAS that forms human coalitions must model such 
uncertainty regarding human user behaviors while reasoning to 
form coalitions.     
In this paper, to solve a HCFP, we propose a multiagent frame-
work called Multiagent Human Coalition Formation (MHCF).  In 
this framework, agents work as assistants to the human users and 
help them form coalitions and solve assigned tasks to earn re-
wards.  The strength of our novel approach lies in our combined 
use of multiagent and generic human-behavior-related knowledge 
to address the aforementioned key issues (i.e., human type trans-
formation due to learning, reward structures, and user modeling). 
Briefly, first, MHCF agents address the type transformation issue 
by considering (1) the agent support, (2) the model of the assigned 
human user, and (2) the change in that model due to his or her 
learning, when estimating the value of a human coalition.  The 
agents address the reward structure issue by using a probabilistic 
model of the environment that take the openness of the system 
and the learning of the human users into account to estimate the 
future-task rewards.  Finally, the agents address the user modeling 
issue by cooperatively learning a probabilistic model of its as-
signed human users and the dynamics of the environment, where 
the cooperative learning enables the user agents to (1) better esti-
mate the uncertain behavior of his or her assigned human user and 
(2) learn about the environment dynamics faster.  To investigate 
the effectiveness of the MHCF framework, we have used it to 
form student coalitions in SimCoL (designed by [4]) —a simula-
tion of students and computer-based scaffolding in a computer-
supported collaborative learning environment.  Our results show 
that the framework is able to form successful coalitions that facili-
tate student learning while solving tasks, leading to overall better 
rewards for student coalitions. 
2. Human Coalition Formation 
2.1 Basic Assumptions and Definitions 
Reflecting on the human coalition formation problem (HFCP), we 
have the following basic Assumptions: (1) (Task) There is a set of 
tasks in the environment that the human users in the environment 
can solve to earn rewards; (2) (Coalitions) The human users can 
form disjoint coalitions to earn rewards; (3) (Behavior) The solu-
tion of each task requires a coalitional action which is composed 
of a series of individual actions from the members of the formed 
coalition; (4) (Learning) The human users participating in the 
task solving activities of their respective coalitions are capable of 
learning from their experiences and improving their behavior, (5) 
(Uncertainty) The behaviors of the human users, i.e., their indi-
vidual actions, in a coalition cannot be accurately modeled, and 
can only be modeled probabilistically; and (6) (Reward) The 
rewards achievable by a human coalition are of: (1) current-task 
(short-term) rewards and (2) future-task (long-term) rewards.  
Further, the current-task reward is a human user’s share in the 
coalitional reward his or her coalition has earned by solving an 
assigned task and can be exactly calculated as soon as the coali-
tion completes the assigned task.  The future-task reward is an 
estimation of the current-task rewards of the future tasks that is 
expected to be available as a human improves as he or she learns.      
Definition 1 (Human Coalition Formation Problem) Given a set 
of human users and a set of tasks, the human coalition formation 
problem (HCFP) refers to the division of that set of human users 
into disjoint groups in such a way that the division optimizes the 
current-task rewards of all the human users over the entire set of 
tasks.  Since at any given time, the set of future tasks and the set 
of human users in the environment are not necessarily known, the 
core of HCFP lies at the tradeoff between maximizing current-
task rewards and maximizing future-task rewards when forming 
the coalitions.   
2.2 Environment 
In this section, we further define the environment through a set of 
assumptions, which are essential in addressing the unique chal-
lenges involving human coalition formation.  We also define 
agent support, a novel component in a MAS where human users 
and user agents co-exist.  With this definition, it allows us to con-
sider the impact and cost of agent support to address user needs. 
Assumption 7 (Environment) The MHCF environment 𝐸 =
 𝐻, 𝑈, 𝑇, 𝐴𝑐 , 𝑆, 𝐸𝑉𝑀  consists of a set of human users 𝐻 =
 𝑕1, … , 𝑕𝑛𝑕 , a set of user agents 𝑈 =  𝑢1 , … , 𝑢𝑛𝑕  , a set of tasks 
𝑇 =  𝑇1, … , 𝑇𝑛𝑡  , a finite set of human user actions 𝐴𝑐  that are 
required to solve the tasks, a system agent 𝑆 that conducts the 
assignment of tasks and distributes rewards, and an evaluation 
metric function in the form 𝐸𝑉𝑀: 𝑇𝑗 × 𝛼 → 𝑅 where 𝛼 ⊆ 𝐴𝑐  and 
𝑅 ∈ ℝ.   
Assumption 8 (Task) The tasks in the MHCF environment are 
denoted by: 𝑇𝑗 =  𝑠𝑡𝑗 , 𝑡𝑙𝑗 , 𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑗 , 𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑗  , where 𝑠𝑡𝑗  is the time the 
coalition can start working on the task, 𝑡𝑙𝑗  is the time limit within 
which the coalition must complete the task, 𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑗  is the actionset(s) 
required to solve this task, and 𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑗 ⊆ 𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑗  is the task actionset(s) 
that are required and completed.  The required actionsets also 
identify the type of a task.  Furthermore, we define the degree of 
type similarity between two tasks 𝑇𝑗  and 𝑇𝑘  as: 𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑡𝑎𝑐  𝑇𝑗 , 𝑇𝑘 =
1 −   𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑗 \𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘  +  𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘\𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑗     𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑗  +  𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘     (1) 
According to Eq. 1, the similarity between the types of two tasks 
is equal to the ratio of the number of required actionsets that are 
common between them (calculated by taking the set difference 
operator \) and the total number of required actionsets they have.  
Assumption 9 (Assistant) Each user agent 𝑢𝑖  in the MHCF envi-
ronment is assigned to a human user 𝑕𝑖  to help that human user 
form coalitions and earn rewards.   
Assumption 10 (Modeling) Each user agent 𝑢𝑖  maintains a model 
𝑕𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝑖   of its assigned human user 𝑕𝑖  and maintains a vector of 
models 𝒉𝒎𝑠,𝑡
𝑖   of a subset of human users 𝐻𝑠 ⊆ 𝐻.  A human user 
model 𝑕𝑚𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑖   is a tuple of attributes  𝑕𝑎𝑖,𝑡 ,1
𝑖 , … , 𝑕𝑎𝑖,𝑡 ,𝑛𝑎
𝑖   where 
𝑕𝑎𝑖,𝑡 ,𝑘
𝑖 ∈ 𝐻𝑎 ∀𝑘.  
Assumption 11 (Coalition) A coalition 𝐶 =  𝐻𝑐 , 𝑈𝑐 , 𝛼𝑐 , 𝒅𝑐 , 𝑔  is 
defined as a five-tuple containing a set of human users 𝐻𝑐 , their 
respectively assigned user agents 𝑈𝑐 , a joint coalitional actionset 
𝛼𝑐 =  𝛼𝑖 , … , 𝛼𝑘  for individual actions 𝛼𝑖  agreed to be performed 
by human users 𝑕𝑖  ∀𝛼𝑖 ∈ 𝛼𝑐  and ∀𝑕𝑖 ∈ 𝐻𝑐 , and a demand vector 
𝒅𝑐 =  𝑑1 , … , 𝑑𝑛𝑑   consisting of agreed demands of the reward 
which is available upon completing the joint coalitional actionset 
𝛼𝑐 .  The goal of the members of a coalition is to perform the joint 
coalitional actionset 𝛼𝑐 =  𝛼1, … , 𝛼𝑛𝑐   where 𝛼𝑖 ∈ 𝐴𝑐  ∀ 𝑖  to re-
ceive coalitional reward 𝐸𝑉𝑀 𝑇𝑐 , 𝛼𝑐 = 𝑅𝑐 .  This coalitional 
reward is then divided proportionally among the members: 𝑅𝑖 =
𝑅𝑐 ⋅ 𝑑𝑖  𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑖∈𝐷𝑐  where 𝑑𝑖  and 𝑅𝑖  are the demand and the indi-
vidual current-task reward of human user 𝑕𝑖  for the task 𝑇𝑐 .  Final-
ly, 𝑔 is a group agent—its role to be specified in Section 2.4—that 
helps the user agents learn. 
Assumption 12 (Time) We assume that the agents’ and human 
users’ actions occur in discrete time quanta 𝑡𝐸 = 𝑡0, … , 𝑡∞ .  Fur-
thermore, we assume that the tasks are assigned to the coalitions 
in a time line τT =  𝜏0 , … , 𝜏𝑛𝑡  .  At any point of time 𝜏𝑖  there is a 
subset of tasks 𝑇𝜏𝑖  where 𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑡𝑎𝑐  𝑇𝑗 , 𝑇𝑘 > 0 ∀ 𝑇𝑗 , 𝑇𝑘 ∈ 𝑇𝜏𝑖 .  That 
means, at any given point of time, there are single instances of 
multiple tasks available for the human coalitions to solve.  In this 
environment, each user agent tries to optimize the rewards for its 
assigned human user by finding the most reward-yielding task and 
the most reward-yielding human coalition for that task.     
Definition 2 (Agent Support) We define agent support or scaf-
folding provided by a user agent 𝑢𝑖  to its assigned human user 𝑕𝑖  
as a function 𝑠𝑐𝑖 𝑕𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝑖 , 𝛼𝑖 =  𝑔𝑐𝑡1 , … , 𝑔𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑐   where 𝑔𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡 ∈
𝑆𝐶 ∀𝑖 while 𝑕𝑖  is working in a coalition 𝐶, having agreed to per-
form action 𝛼𝑖  where the user agent  𝑢𝑖  supports its human user 
accordingly with action 𝑔𝑐𝑡𝑖  .  We define the cost of scaffolding 
as: 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡  𝑠𝑐𝑖 𝑕𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝑖 , 𝛼𝑐  ∈ ℝ.  Furthermore, we define the set of 
scaffolding provided by the user agents in a coalition 𝐶 as: 
𝑆𝐶𝑐 ,𝑡 =  𝑠𝑐𝑖 𝑕𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝑖 , 𝛼𝑖 |∀𝑢𝑖 , 𝑕𝑖 ∈ 𝐶 . 
Assumption 13 (State) The states of the MHCF environment are 
denoted by 𝜔 =  𝐶𝑆, 𝑇𝐶𝑆 , 𝒅𝐶𝑆 , 𝜶𝐶𝑆 , 𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆 .  Here 𝐶𝑆 is the coali-
tion structure, 𝑇𝐶𝑆 ⊆ 𝑇 is the set of tasks assigned to the coalitions 
𝐶 ∈ 𝐶𝑆, 𝒅𝐶𝑆  is the vector of demand vectors of the coalitions 
𝐶 ∈ 𝐶𝑆, 𝜶𝐶𝑆  is the vector of joint coalitional actionsets being 
carried out in coalitions 𝐶 ∈ 𝐶𝑆, and 𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆  is the set of scaffolding 
actions of the user agents 𝑢𝑖’s working in the coalitions 𝐶 ∈ 𝐶𝑆.  
Furthermore, a state at time 𝑡 is defined by:  
𝜔𝑡 =  𝐶𝑆𝑡 , 𝑇𝐶𝑆,𝑡 , 𝒅𝐶𝑆,𝑡 , 𝜶𝐶𝑆 ,𝑡 , 𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆,𝑡 . 
Assumption 14 (Observable State) We assume that each agent is 
able to obtain only a partial view of the environment—
specifically, it is able to obtain information regarding its own 
coalitions.  The states of the MHCF environment that are observ-
able by a user agent 𝑢𝑖  at time 𝑡 are denoted by 𝜔𝑡
𝑖 =
 𝐶𝑡 , 𝑇𝑐 ,𝑡 , 𝒅𝑐 ,𝑡 , 𝛼𝑐 ,𝑡 , 𝑆𝐶𝑐,𝑡 .  Here 𝐶𝑡  is the coalition, 𝑇𝐶,𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 is the 
set of assigned tasks, 𝒅𝐶,𝑡  is the demand vector, 𝛼𝐶,𝑡  is the joint 
coalitional actionset being carried out, and 𝑆𝐶𝐶,𝑡  is the set of scaf-
folding actions of the user agents in the coalition 𝐶𝑡 . at time 𝑡. 
2.3 Problem Definition 
Definition 3 (The Multiagent Human Coalition Formation 
(MHCF) Problem): Given the environment 
𝐸 =  𝐻, 𝑈, 𝑇, 𝐴𝑐 , 𝑆, 𝐸𝑉𝑀 , the MHCF problem refers to a partition 
of the set of human users into coalitions that optimizes the total 
reward earned by the human users over a set of tasks , 
 max𝐶𝑆  𝑅𝑖,𝑗 ,𝑡𝑕 𝑖∈𝐶𝑡∈𝐶𝑆𝑡𝑡∈𝜏𝑇   (2) 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑗 ,𝑡  is the reward of human user 𝑕𝑖  while working in the 
coalition 𝐶𝑡  to solve task 𝑇𝑗  at time 𝑡.  Solving this problem faces 
several challenges.  First, the total number of coalitions possible 
for a set of human users 𝐻 is 2𝐻 .  Therefore, finding the coalition 
structure that optimizes the total reward of the set of human users 
will be a computationally intractable problem [13].  Second, since 
the real-world systems are often open, it will be a waste of re-
sources to compute the optimally rewarding coalitional structure 
for the entire set of tasks since the set of human users and the 
available tasks could change over time.  Third, since human beha-
vior changes over time, we argue that by making sequentially 
rational [2] decisions in forming coalitions, it is possible to 
achieve near optimal rewards for the human users over an entire 
set of tasks.  Finally, due to uncertainty in modeling the human 
user behavior, it may not be possible to calculate the coalition 
structure that would maximize the reward of all the human users 
for any task.   
Therefore, instead of finding an algorithm that achieves this goal 
of the human coalition formation problem but may be difficult to 
implement in a real-world system due to high computational com-
plexity, we propose a modified version of the multiagent human 
coalition formation problem in which the individual agents try to 
make sequentially rational [2] decisions over a set of tasks to 
allow its assigned human user to join the highest-reward-yielding 
coalitions based on the information available to it during that 
round of coalition formation. 
Definition 4 (Multiagent Human Coalition Formation Problem 
for Individual Agents) In the environment 𝐸 =
 𝐻, 𝑈, 𝑇, 𝑆, 𝐸𝑉𝑀 , the multiagent human coalition formation prob-
lem (from the perspective of an individual user agent 𝑢𝑖) refers to 
finding a 𝐶, identifying the necessary scaffolding 𝑠𝑐𝑖 𝑕𝑚𝑖
𝑖 , 𝛼𝑖 , 
and when considering action 𝛼𝑖  at any state 𝜔𝑡
𝑖  such that, the sum 
of the expected reward for joining the coalition for the current 
task 𝑇𝑗  starting at time 𝜏𝑗  minus the cost of scaffolding the human 
user for the current task is maximized. This can be written as: 
max𝐶 max𝛼𝑖 max𝑠𝑐𝑖   𝑅𝑖,𝑗 ,𝜏𝑗 +𝑡𝑙𝑗  𝜔𝑡
𝑖    (3) 
where, the total expected reward 𝑅𝑖 ,𝑘 ,𝑡 ′  𝜔𝑡
𝑖  at some state 𝜔𝑡
𝑖  is 
defined as:  
𝑅𝑖,𝑗 ,𝜏𝑗 +𝑡𝑙𝑗  𝜔𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑅𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑗 ,𝜏𝑗 +𝑡𝑙𝑗  𝜔𝑡
𝑖 +  𝑅𝑓𝑡𝑖 ,𝑘 ,𝑡 ′  𝜔𝑡
𝑖 𝑡 ′ ,𝑇𝑘⊆𝑇 −
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡  𝑠𝑐𝑖 𝑕𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝑖 , 𝛼𝑖    (4) 
where 𝑡 ′ = 𝜏𝑘 + 𝑡𝑙𝑘 , 𝑅𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑗 ,𝜏𝑗 +𝑡𝑙𝑗  𝜔𝑡
𝑖  is the expected current-task 
reward of the human user 𝑕𝑖  for task 𝑇𝑗  assigned at time 𝜏𝑗  and 
whose reward is available at time 𝜏𝑗 + 𝑡𝑙𝑗 . Furthermore, 
𝑅𝑓𝑡𝑖,𝑘 ,𝑡 ′  𝜔𝑡
𝑖  is the expected future-task reward for future tasks 𝑇𝑘  
that would be available to the human coalitions at time 𝜏𝑘  and 
whose reward would be available at time 𝑡 ′ ∈ 𝜏𝑇 + 𝑡𝑙𝑘 .  Finally, 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡  𝑠𝑐𝑖 𝑕𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝑖 , 𝛼𝑖   is the cost incurred by the user agent 𝑢𝑖  for 
providing scaffolding to the human user 𝑕𝑖  for contributing indi-
vidual action 𝛼𝑖  to the joint coalitional action 𝛼𝑐 .   
3 Design of the MHCF Framework 
Here we describe two key components of the MHCF framework: 
negotiation and learning.  The agents use negotiation to form coa-
litions.  Each agent also learns the model of its assigned human 
user and those of other relevant human users, and the probabilities 
for the impact of agent-provided scaffolding.   
3.1  Coalition Formation by Negotiation 
Our proposed negotiation-based coalition formation method con-
sists of three main stages: initialization, negotiation, and finaliza-
tion.  
Stage 1 (Initialization) In the initialization stage, the system 
agent communicates with all the user agents and announces the 
tasks the human users need to complete in the upcoming round of 
coalition formation. 
Stage 2 (Negotiation) The negotiation is a three-step process that 
is carried out in rounds.  These steps are: proposition, considera-
tion, and notification.  Next we describe these steps in details. 
1. Proposition: We assume that at the beginning of the negotia-
tion process, each user agent is in a singleton coalition.  Then at 
each round of the negotiation process, one agent is randomly se-
lected (with equal probability) to be a proposer who acts as the 
initiator of the negotiation process  Once the negotiation process 
starts, the chosen proposer agent has the following options:  (1) it 
can choose to stay in its own coalition with everything unchanged, 
i.e., relinquish its turn, (2) it can propose to modify its own coali-
tion with a renewed demand, and (3) it can propose to form a new 
coalition with a new proposal with a new set of coalition members 
and a new demand.  In our negotiation protocol, we assume that 
all agents, even those that have already formed a coalition, partic-
ipate throughout the entire negotiation period.  Furthermore, some 
agents may be in a singleton coalition during the negotiation 
rounds and it may take several rounds of negotiation for some 
agents to give up its singleton coalition and join some other large 
coalition.  Finally, the proposer proposes to all of its potential 
coalition members at the same time.  The proposal of a user agent 
is defined as the following: 
Definition 5 (Proposal) The proposal of a user agent 𝑢𝑖  to user 
agent 𝑢𝑗  at time 𝑡 is a 5-tuple 𝑝𝑠𝑖,𝑗 ,𝑡 =  𝒉𝒎𝑐 ,𝑡
𝑖 , 𝑑𝑗 ,𝑡 , 𝛼𝑖 ∈
𝛼𝑐 , 𝑠𝑐𝑖 𝑕𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝑖 , 𝛼𝑖   made by 𝑢𝑖  to form coalition 𝐶𝑡 ∈ 𝐶𝑆𝑡 , 𝒉𝒎𝑐 ,𝑡
𝑖  
as the vector of human user models (without user agent/human 
user identities) that will be in the proposed coalition as viewed by 
user agent 𝑢𝑖 , 𝑑𝑗 ,𝑡  as the demand of reward for 𝑕𝑗  determined by 
𝑢𝑖  ―on behalf of‖ 𝑢𝑗  respectively, 𝛼𝑐  as the joint coalitional ac-
tionset of the coalition 𝐶𝑡 ∈ 𝐶𝑆𝑡  in which 𝛼𝑖  is the action that 𝑕𝑖  is 
going to contribute to the coalition, and 𝑠𝑐𝑖 𝑕𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝑖 , 𝛼𝑖  is the scaf-
folding provided by 𝑢𝑖  for its assigned human user 𝑕𝑖  with user 
model 𝑕𝑚𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑖 .   
Definition 6 (Value of a Coalition) The value of a coalition from 
the perspective of an agent 𝑢𝑖  assigned to human user 𝑕𝑖  is:  
𝑉𝑡
𝑖 𝐶𝑡|𝒉𝒎𝑐,𝑡
𝑖  =
max𝛼∈𝐴𝑐  Pr 𝛼𝑐 |𝒉𝒎𝑐,𝑡
𝑖 , 𝑆𝐶𝑐 ,𝑡 Pr 𝜔𝑡
𝑖 |𝛼𝑐 𝑅𝑖,𝑗 ,𝑡 𝜔𝑡
𝑖 𝑡∈𝜏,𝑇𝑗 ∈𝑇   (5) 
So, the value of a coalition is the maximum sum of the expected 
reward it can generate over all future states in which task reward 
can be collected.  The value of the expected reward is calculated 
by multiplying: (1) the probability of performing joint coalitional 
actionset  for a given vector of human user models and the scaf-
folding  agreed upon by the user agents to be provided to that 
group, (2) the probability of reaching a state  after taking a joint 
coalitional actionset,  and (3) the total reward  available to the user 
agent at that state.     
Furthermore, the proposer’s choice of the demand (or offer from 
the proposer’s perspective) for the responder, i.e., 𝑑𝑗  , depends on 
the proposer agent’s estimate of the value of the human user 
represented by the responder in the coalition, and is calculated as 
the following. 
Definition 7 (Value of a Human User) The value of a human user 
𝑕𝑗  in the coalition 𝐶𝑡  as calculated by the user agent 𝑢𝑖  as:  
𝑉𝑡
𝑖 𝑕𝑚𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑖 |𝐶𝑡 =  𝑉𝑡
𝑖 𝐶𝑡|𝒉𝒎𝑐,𝑡
𝑖  − 𝑉𝑡
𝑖  𝐶𝑡|𝒉𝒎𝑐\ 𝑕𝑗  ,𝑡
𝑖   /
𝑉𝑡
𝑖 𝐶𝑡|𝒉𝒎𝑐,𝑡
𝑖    (6) 
So, the value of the human user in the coalition is found by calcu-
lating the difference between the value of the coalition with that 
human user and the value of the coalition without that human user 
and then dividing that difference with the value of the whole coa-
lition.     
Assumption 15 (Reward Valuation) The human users are hetero-
geneous with respect to their valuation of current-task and future-
task. 
Definition 8 (Total Reward) The total reward for joining a coali-
tion from the perspective of an agent 𝑢𝑖  assigned to human user 𝑕𝑖  
for solving some task 𝑇𝑗  in a coalition 𝐶 is: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑖  𝜔𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑣𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑖  𝜔𝑡
𝑖 ⋅ 𝑅𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑖  𝜔𝑡
𝑖 + 𝑣𝑓𝑡𝑖,𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑖  𝜔𝑡
𝑖 ⋅
𝑅𝑓𝑡𝑖,𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑖  𝜔𝑡
𝑖  (7) 
According to Eq. 7, the total reward available to a human user at a 
state is the sum of current-task and future-task rewards weighted 
by its human user’s valuations of those rewards. 
Furthermore, the current-task reward in Eq. 7 is calculated as,  
𝑅𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑖  𝜔𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑑𝑖 ⋅ 𝑅𝑐𝑡𝑐
𝑖 𝜔𝑡
𝑖 /  𝑑𝑖𝑕 𝑖∈𝐻𝑐  (8) 
where 𝑑𝑖 ∈ 𝒅𝑐  is the demand of the human user 𝑕𝑖  (Assumption 
11) for the coalitional reward.  So, a human user’s share of the 
current-task reward is calculated by dividing his or her demand 
with the total demand of the entire coalition which the coalition 
members agreed upon (Assumption 11) during the negotiation 
stage.  Next, the future-task reward is defined as: 
𝑅𝑓𝑡𝑖,𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑖  𝜔𝑡
𝑖 =
 Pr  𝑕𝑚′𝑖,𝑡 ′
𝑖
|𝜔𝜏𝑗
𝑖  Pr  𝜔𝑡 ′′
𝑖 |𝑕𝑚′𝑖 ,𝑡 ′
𝑖
 𝑇𝑗 ∈𝑇,𝑡 ′′>𝑡 ′>𝑡∈𝜏 𝑅𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑖  𝜔𝑡 ′′
𝑖   (9) 
Here, the future-task reward is calculated by multiplying: (1) the 
probability of the model of its human user being changed in state 
𝜔𝜏𝑗
𝑖  after completing the current task, (2) the probability of reach-
ing future states due to that changed human user model, and (3) 
the current-task rewards.  The inspiration of describing the future-
task reward using Eq. 7 comes from Assumptions 3 and 4.  We 
assume that human users are able to learn from their experiences 
of working in coalitions and are able to modify their behavior 
(e.g., acquire new capabilities) as a result of that learning.  This 
future-task reward is designed to estimate how much reward in 
future a human user may earn from his or her experience of work-
ing in this coalition.    
2. Consideration: Once approached by a proposer in the proposi-
tion stage, the responding agent has three types of replies: (1) 
accept the proposal as is, (2) reject the proposal outright, and (3) 
provide a counter-proposal to the proposer agent with the same 
coalition members but with an increased demand for itself.   
The criterion for accepting a proposal is the following.  A res-
ponding agent would only accept a proposal iff the value of the 
proposed coalition (Eq. 5) is strictly greater than the value of its 
current coalition.  In other words, a responding agent 𝑢𝑗  currently 
in the coalition 𝐶𝑡  would switch coalition for a new proposal 
𝑝𝑠𝑖,𝑗 ,𝑡 =  𝑖𝑑𝑖 , 𝒉𝒎𝑐 ′ ,𝑡
𝑖 , 𝑑𝑗 ,𝑡 , 𝛼𝑖 ∈ 𝛼𝑐 , 𝑠𝑐𝑖 𝑕𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝑖 , 𝛼𝑖   iff 
𝑉𝑡
𝑗
 𝐶𝑡
′ |𝒉𝒎
𝑐 ′,𝑡
𝑗
 > 𝑉𝑡
𝑗
 𝐶𝑡|𝒉𝒎𝑐,𝑡
𝑗
  . 
If the responding user agent decides to revise the proposal, it will 
send out a counter-proposal to the proposer agent. We define the 
counter-proposal as the following: 
Definition 9 (Counter-Proposal) The counter-proposal of a user 
agent 𝑢𝑗  to user agent 𝑢𝑖  is a 4-tuple 𝑝𝑠𝑗 ,𝑖 ,𝑡
′ =  𝑕𝑚𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑗
, 𝑑𝑗 ,𝑡 , 𝛼𝑗 ∈
𝛼𝑐 , 𝑠𝑐𝑗 𝑕𝑚𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑗
, 𝛼𝑗  , 𝑝𝑠𝑖,𝑗 ,𝑡0  made by 𝑢𝑗  to revise the proposal post-
ed by 𝑢𝑖  to form coalition 𝐶𝑡 ∈ 𝐶𝑆𝑡 , 𝑑𝑗  as the demand of reward 
for 𝑕𝑗  determined by 𝑢𝑗 .  Notice that this new demand 𝑑𝑗 ,𝑡 ∝
𝑉𝑡
𝑗
 𝑕𝑚𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑗
|𝐶𝑡  is calculated by the responding agent using Eq. 6.  
Furthermore, 𝛼𝑐  is the joint coalitional actionset of the coalition 
𝐶𝑡 ∈ 𝐶𝑆𝑡 , 𝛼𝑗  is the human user 𝑕𝑗 ’s contribution to the joint coali-
tional actionset 𝛼𝑐 ,  𝑠𝑐𝑗 𝑕𝑚𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑗
, 𝛼𝑗  is the scaffolding provided by 
the user agent 𝑢𝑗  to its assigned human user 𝑕𝑗 , and 𝑝𝑠𝑖,𝑗 ,𝑡0  is the 
original proposal put forth by the user agent 𝑢𝑖  at time 𝑡𝑜 < 𝑡.   
3. Notification:  Once the proposer agent receives the counter-
proposal, it first updates its own model of the human user 
represented by the responding agent from the information in the 
counter-proposal using the following formula.   
𝑕𝑎𝑗 ,𝑡 ,𝑘
𝑖 ←  𝑤𝑜 ⋅ 𝑕𝑎𝑗 ,𝑡 ,𝑘
𝑖 + 𝑤𝑛 ⋅ 𝑕𝑎𝑗 ,𝑡 ,𝑘
𝑗
  𝑤𝑜 + 𝑤𝑛    ∀𝑕𝑎𝑗 ,𝑡 ,𝑘
𝑖 ∈
𝑕𝑚𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑖  (10) 
Notice that in Eq. 10, the proposer updates each attribute of its 
assigned human user by finding an weighted average of the: (1) 
the old value calculated by the proposer and (2) the new value 
described by the responder.  This model exchange acts as a learn-
ing mechanism for all negotiating agents allowing them to update 
their models of the human users they would like to form coalitions 
with.  Furthermore, the weights allow the proposer to balance the 
emphasis on its own model of a human user and the modeling of 
that human user by the responder agent.  According to Assumption 
4, the model of a human user changes over time due to his or her 
learning as he or she participates in joint coalitional actions.  Fur-
thermore, we assume that the user agents are able to observe the 
actions and behavior of the human users in its own coalition only.  
As a result, one of the two following situations may occur: (1) the 
proposer’s assigned human user may not have ever been in a coa-
lition with the responder’s human user, i.e., the proposer does not 
have a model of the responder’s human user; or (2) the proposer 
has an outdated model of a responder’s human user. 
Once the model is updated, the proposer has the following op-
tions: (1) accept the counter-proposal or (2) reject the counter-
proposal.  Whether the proposer accepts the counter-proposal 
depends on: (1) the discrepancy between the proposer and the 
responding agent’s model of the responding agent’s assigned hu-
man user (i.e., the difference between 𝑕𝑚𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑖  and 𝑕𝑚𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑗
) and (2) the 
human users represented by the user agent in the coalition.  We 
define the discrepancy between the models of a human user pre-
pared by two different user agents as: 
Definition 10 (Model Discrepancy) The discrepancy between the 
models of a human user 𝑕𝑖  as prepared by the two different user 
agents 𝑢𝑖  and 𝑢𝑗  is: 
𝑀𝐷 𝑕𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝑖 , 𝑕𝑚𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑗
 =  𝑤𝑖 ⋅ 𝐶𝐷 𝑕𝑎𝑖,𝑡
𝑖 , 𝑕𝑎𝑖,𝑡
𝑗
 𝑖=1,…, 𝑕𝑚 𝑖𝑖 
 (11) 
where, 𝐶𝐷 𝑕𝑎𝑖
𝑖 , 𝑕𝑎𝑖
𝑗
 ∝  𝑕𝑎𝑖
𝑖 − 𝑕𝑎𝑖
𝑗
  denotes the difference be-
tween the attribute values modeled by the user agents 𝑢𝑖  and 𝑢𝑗 , 
i.e., difference between the values of 𝑕𝑎𝑖
𝑖  and 𝑕𝑎𝑖
𝑗
 and 𝑤𝑖s are 
weights since not all attribute difference would impact the per-
formance of the human user in a coalition in the same way.   
Once the model is updated, the proposer agent would accept the 
counter-proposal 𝑝𝑠𝑗 ,𝑖 ,𝑡
′  and revise its own proposal 𝑝𝑠𝑖,𝑗 ,𝑡 , iff, 
𝑉𝑡
𝑖 𝑕𝑚𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑖 |𝐶𝑡 > 𝑑𝑗 ,𝑡  𝑑𝑖𝑕 𝑖∈𝐶 ∈ 𝑝𝑠𝑗 ,𝑖 ,𝑡
′   (11) 
In Eq. 11, 𝑉𝑡
𝑖 𝑕𝑚𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑖 |𝐶𝑡  is calculated using Eq. 6.  So, according 
to our reasoning, the responding agent’s revised demand would be 
accepted by the proposer if that updated demand is less than the 
responding user agent’s value in the coalition calculated with the 
proposer’s updated model.   
Once the proposer agent accepts or rejects the counter-proposal, it 
will communicate its decision to the responding agent and com-
plete the negotiation round.  If all of the user agents to whom the 
proposer proposed to, agrees to join its coalition, the proposer 
then forms the coalition and sends out the coalition formation 
message: 𝑀𝑐𝑓 =  𝒉𝒎𝑐 ,𝑡
𝑖 , 𝒅𝑐 , 𝛼𝑐  to all of the proposed user agents.  
Stage 3 (Finalization) In the finalization stage, the system agent 
signals the user agents to stop the negotiation rounds and assigns 
tasks to the formed coalitions.  Once the tasks are assigned, the 
proposer agents send out a coalition revelation message: 𝑀𝑖𝑟 =
 𝑈𝑖 ,   𝑢𝑖 , 𝑕𝑖 , 𝛼𝑖 |𝑕𝑖 ∈ 𝐻𝑐 , 𝛼𝑖 ∈ 𝛼𝑐   which reveals the identity of 
the members of the coalition (i.e., 𝑈𝑖s) and the task assignments 
(i.e.,  𝑢𝑖 , 𝑕𝑖 , 𝛼𝑖 ) to the member user agents.   
3.2 Learning for Coalition Formation 
The learning aspect of the MHCF framework is complex.  First, 
the human users learn from their experience working in coalitions.  
Second, the agents learn about modeling their human users more 
accurately.  Driving an agent’s learning is its goal of selecting the 
right coalition, identifying the right task, and providing the right 
scaffolding for its assigned human user to achieve maximum total 
reward (per Def. 4, Eq.3): 
Definition 11 (Learning Goal) The learning goal of an agent in 
the MHCF environment consists of (1) learning the model of its 
assigned human user, (2) learning the models of a subset of other 
human users with which its assigned human user may form coali-
tion, and (3) learning the probabilities that capture the impact on 
the model (or type) of a human user due to the user-agent-
provided scaffolding on: (a) completing the current task and earn-
ing current-task rewards and (b) improving the human user’s 
model by learning and earning future-task rewards.   
Our solution to the learning problem utilizes both model-based 
and cooperative (or divided [3] ) learning.  Using the model-based 
learning, the user agents learn the values of the different attributes 
of a given model of its assigned human user and the other human 
users in the MHCF environment through interactions.  Each user 
agent, based on its own experience and through experience shar-
ing with other agents, learn a model of the environment that (1) 
describes the generic dynamics of a human coalition formation 
environment and (2) links the task and the human user’s models 
with their rewards (both current-task and future-task ones). 
Learning Assigned Human User’s Model.   
Assumption 16 (Learning Attribute Values through Observa-
tion) The user agents are able to observe/learn the current state of 
its assigned human user’s model periodically.  For example, these 
observations can be in the form of psychometric tests or surveys 
that are performed by the user agents on their human users.   
Assumption 17 (Finite Attribute Categorization) Each attribute 
regarding the human user behavior can be divided into a finite set 
of categories.  
Here, finite attribute categorization (which is common in various 
psychometric tests) allows the user agents to overcome the so-
called continuous state problem because, when every attribute in 
the human user model is divided into a finite set of categories, the 
total number of observable states (Assumption 14) for the user 
agents is reduced to a significantly smaller finite number.  This 
reduction of the total number of observable states helps the user 
agent learn the probability values in the environment better which 
in turn helps their reasoning process while forming coalitions.   
Learning Other Human Users’ Models.  As discussed earlier, 
the user agents have to learn other potential human user’s models 
and they have to update those learned models since a user agent is 
able to observe only its assigned human user’s model (Assumption 
16).  One way the user agents can learn the models of a subset of 
other human users is through the negotiation process.  Notice that 
during the counter-proposal stage (Section 2.4) of the negotiation 
process, the responder provides the user agent an updated model 
of its assigned human user.  Using this negotiation mechanism, 
the proposer agents can update their models of the subset of po-
tential coalition members when those members’ user agents act as 
the responders in the negotiation process.   
Learning the Probabilistic Model of the Environment.  In a 
way, the user agents learn the probabilistic model of the MHCF 
environment so that the user agents share the burden of learning 
among themselves.  With this approach of cooperative learning, 
two questions arise: (1) how is the probabilistic model regarding 
the MHCF environment represented by individual agents? and (2) 
how do the agents share their learned probability values with each 
other?  For modeling the probabilities of the environment, the user 
agents use Bayesian networks, and for sharing the learned proba-
bility values, the user agents use group-agent-mediated coopera-
tive learning.  A Bayesian network (BN) is a triplet  𝑉, 𝐺, ℘  
where 𝑉 is a set of variables, 𝐺 is a connected DAG whose nodes 
correspond one-to-one to members of 𝑉 such that each variable is 
conditionally independent of its non-descendants given its par-
ents, and ℘ is a set of probability distributions.  Say the parent of 
nodes 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉 is denoted by 𝜋 𝑣 , then, ℘ =  𝑃 𝑣|𝜋 𝑣  |∀𝑣 ∈ 𝑉  
(15) and 𝑃 𝑉 = Π𝑣∈𝑉𝑃 𝑣|𝜋 𝑣    (16).  Figure 1 shows the BN 
structure of the MHCF environment as used by the user agents. 
Fig. 1 shows the nodes and the edges that represent the generic 
structure of the BNs that is used by the user agents in the MHCF 
environment. Notice that Fig. 1 describes the BN of user agent 𝑢𝑖  
who is assigned to human user 𝑕𝑖  with model 𝑕𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝑖  working in 
coalition 𝐶 with other human users with model 𝒉𝒎𝑐 ,𝑡
𝑖  where the 
user agents in the group are providing scaffolding 𝑆𝐶𝑐,𝑡 .  The BN 
in Fig. 1 would allow the user agents to determine, probabilities 
like Pr 𝛼𝑐 |𝒉𝒎𝑐,𝑡
𝑖 , 𝑆𝐶𝑐,𝑡  (Eq. 5, 6) and Pr  𝑕𝑚
′
𝑖 ,𝑡 ′
𝑖
|𝜔𝜏𝑗
𝑖   (Eq. 7, 9).  
 
Fig. 1: Descriptive BN Structure of the MHCF Environment 
Group-Agent-Mediated Cooperative Learning of BN.  We use 
group agents to mediate cooperative learning within each coalition 
of agents. While the human users in a coalition are working, the 
user agents observe the actions of their assigned human users and 
update their own BNs.  When the coalition’s task is over and the 
rewards are distributed, the user agents upload their own BNs to 
the group agent assigned to their respective groups.  Once the 
group agents have collected the BN from their user agents, they 
communicate among themselves and use the BN-Update algo-
rithm (communication complexity 𝑂(𝑛𝑔)), as shown in Table 1, to 
create an updated BN.  The group agents then send the updated 
BN to each of the user agents in their group.  Finally, the user 
agents combine the updated BN with their existing BN probability 
values to update their own BNs.   
Note that with the above cooperative learning mechanism, there 
are the following advantages: (1) the user agents need to commu-
nicate only twice with the group agents, (2) the user agents have 
to reveal only a small subset of probabilities to the group agents, 
and (3) given a heterogeneous environment with different types of 
human users, tasks, and scaffolding, the user agents are able to 
learn the probabilities faster and more accurately together than 
they would have learned individually.   
Table 1: BN-Update for Group Agent 𝒈𝒊 
BN-Update for Group Agent 𝒈𝒊 
1. Initialize: 𝑃 ← 𝜙, 𝑃𝑢 ← 𝜙, 𝑃𝑜 ← 𝜙 
2.Collect BN probability set 𝑃 =  𝑃𝑖 , … , 𝑃𝑘  from user agents 
 𝑢𝑖 , … , 𝑢𝑘 ∈ 𝐺𝑖  
3.Unify the collected probabilities: 𝑃𝑢 ← 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑦𝐵𝑁 𝑃   
4.If received probability 𝑃𝑜
′  from group agent 𝐺𝑜  
𝑃𝑜 ← 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵𝑁 𝑃𝑜 , 𝑃𝑜
′   
5.If available, collect BN token and group agent list 
𝐺𝑐 =  𝑔1 , … , 𝑔𝑘   
a. For each group agent 𝐺𝑐 =  𝑔1 , … , 𝑔𝑘 , Send 𝑃𝑢  
b. Send BN token and 𝐺𝑐\ 𝑔𝑘 , 𝑔𝑖  to 𝑔𝑘  
6. Else If received BN token and group agent list 𝐺𝑐  from 𝑔𝑘+1 
a. For each group agent 𝐺𝑐 =  𝑔1 , … , 𝑔𝑘 , Send 𝑃𝑢  
b. Send BN token and 𝐺𝑐\ 𝑔𝑘  to 𝑔𝑘  
 
7. Update BN probability using 𝑃𝑜 ← 𝑈𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵𝑁 𝑃𝑢 , 𝑃𝑜  
8. Send BN probability set 𝑃𝑜  to user agents  𝑢𝑖 , … , 𝑢𝑘  
The key functions in Table 1 can be defined as follows: 
𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑦𝐵𝑁 𝑃𝑜 , 𝑃𝑜
′  
=   𝛾𝑖 ⋅ Pr𝑖 𝑥|𝑦, 𝑧 ∀𝑃𝑖∈𝑃  /  𝛾𝑖𝑖    ∀𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝐵𝑁 (17) 
where 𝛾𝑖  is the number of observations that occurred in the group 
agent 𝑔𝑖’s group (i.e., the group agent 𝑔𝑖’s confidence on the cal-
culated probability) and Pr𝑖 𝑥|𝑦, 𝑧  are the various probabilities 
measured by the user agents 𝑢𝑖  ∈ 𝐺𝑖\ 𝑢𝑖 . 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵𝑁 𝑃𝑜 , 𝑃𝑜
′  
=  Pr𝑜 𝑥|𝑦, 𝑧 + Pr𝑜
′  𝑥|𝑦, 𝑧   /2  ∀𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝐵𝑁 (18) 
where  Pro
′  𝑥|𝑦, 𝑧   are the various probabilities measured by the 
user agents 𝑢𝑜 ∈ 𝐺𝑖\ 𝑢𝑖  
𝑈𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵𝑁 𝑃𝑢 , 𝑃𝑜 = 
 γ ⋅ Pr𝑢 𝑥|𝑦, 𝑧  +  1 − γ Pr𝑜 𝑥|𝑦, 𝑧   /2  ∀𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝐵𝑁 (19) 
3.3 Novelty of MHCF Design 
The novelty of the MHCF framework lies in the design of its ne-
gotiation protocol and learning strategy.  First, our design of the 
negotiation protocol allows the user agents to balance the current-
task (estimated from their model) and future-task rewards (esti-
mated from their model and the support of their agents) while 
forming coalitions.  This novel design allows the user agents to 
exploit the learning capability of the human users to form coali-
tions that improves the model of human users while solving the 
current task.  Second, unlike the typical multiagent coalition for-
mation protocols, the negotiation protocol in MHCF allows the 
user agents to take the agent scaffolding into account while esti-
mating the value of a human user or a coalition.  This aspect of 
the design of the negotiation protocol allows the user agents to: 
(1) improve the current-task and future-task rewards of its as-
signed human user by capitalizing on the human learning and (2) 
more accurately judge the value of a coalition by considering the 
scaffolding provided by the agents of other human users, and (3) 
reason by balancing the cost and benefit of providing the scaffold-
ing to the human users.  Finally, the probabilistic calculation of 
the current-task reward and future-task reward allows the user 
agents to incorporate the openness of the environment and the 
learning capability of human users of different models to better 
estimate the value of a human user and that or a coalition.   
Second, the novelty in the learning process of the user agents in 
the MHCF environment lies in the following. First, a model-based 
cooperative learning strategy allows the user agents to estimate 
the values of a human user and a coalition more accurately and at 
a faster rate than that of a regular reinforcement learning strategy.  
Second, the design of our model-based learning allows the user 
agents to take three important elements: (1) the model of a human 
user, (2) the support provided by his or her user agent, and (3) the 
models and the scaffolding of his or her group members into ac-
count while calculating the current-task and future-task rewards of 
a human coalition.  Since the typical multiagent framework does 
not consider these three elements, it would be difficult for their 
agents to accurately estimate the short-term and long-term re-
wards available for a human user in a coalition.   
Due to these novel approaches, the MHCF framework is better 
suited to solve the problem of forming human coalitions than are 
the typical multiagent coalition formation frameworks. 
4. IMPLEMENTATION 
To test the effectiveness of using MHCF in forming human coali-
tion, we have adopted SimCoL [4]—a multiagent application for 
simulating the collaborative learning of a set of students in the 
Computer-Supported Collaborative Learning (CSCL) environ-
ment.  SimCoL contains agents that act as the students collaborat-
ing in a CSCL classroom and an agent who act as the teacher of 
that classroom.  In our implementation of MHCF in SimCoL, we 
have added agents to provide support to: (1) the students (student 
agents), (2) the teacher (teacher agent), and (3) the groups (group 
agents).  In our implementation: (1) the student agents in SimCoL 
act as the user agents, (2) the teacher agent in SimCoL acts as the 
system agent, and (3) the group agent acts as the group agent.  
The tasks in SimCoL are typical classroom problems that contain 
several subtasks and those subtasks have difficulty values as-
signed by the teacher.  Each student in SimCoL has a model that 
contains: knowledge, ability, motivation, emotion, and social 
relationship with others.  The student agents in MHCF used the 
ability (calculated in SimCoL using knowledge, motivation, and 
emotion) and social-relationship of the students to build the stu-
dent model.  Furthermore, we have provided BN (like Fig. 1) to 
the student agents in SimCoL which contains the probability val-
ues they exchange with other student agents.  Equipped with the 
student models and the BN, the student agents negotiate with 
other student agents to choose a subtask that is suitable for their 
assigned students.  Once the coalitions are formed, the students in 
SimCoL collaborate with their peers to solve their assigned sub-
tasks while the student agents monitor their activities and provide 
task-dependent scaffolding.  This scaffolding improves the reci-
pient student’s expertise and helps him or her solve the assigned 
subtask better.  When the collaborative session is over, the teacher 
agent rewards each student a score that is proportional to the sum 
of the difficulty of the assigned subtask and the final solution 
quality of that subtask. 
5. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS 
To test the effectiveness of MHCF framework, we have randomly 
generated 99 student models in SimCoL and 50 tasks where each 
task contained 3 different subtasks.  Furthermore, < 50% of the 
total set of subtasks contained similar concepts and were random-
ly distributed (not known to the student agents forming the coali-
tions) among the 50 tasks.  Then MHCF framework was used to 
form three-member coalitions for each task and the students col-
laborated to solve the task and earn rewards.  We had two main 
foci of our investigation: first, we investigated the ability of the 
MHCF framework of forming student coalitions that are able to 
collaborate and earn rewards in the environment.  Second, we 
investigated the MHCF framework’s ability to exploit human 
learning and improve the total reward over the entire set of tasks.  
Fig.2 shows the average knowledge gain of the students for the 50 
tasks they solved.   
 
Fig. 2: Average Knowledge Gain over Time 
The trend in Fig. 2 shows that over time, the students were able to 
gain more knowledge per classroom session.  Furthermore, a simi-
lar trend is observed when the total reward earned by the students 
is plotted against the number of tasks completed.  The outcome of 
the student coalitions consists of the knowledge and reward gain 
of the students. Furthermore, the setup of SimCoL dictates that 
student coalitions may gain knowledge and earn rewards when 
their members have high ability difference and high social rela-
tionship values.  When this is not the case, the collaboration 
process among the members may break down and they may fail to 
earn reward or gain knowledge.  So, our results imply that the 
MHCF framework was able to form student coalitions that lead to 
successful collaborations and the entire set of students were able 
to improve their knowledge and earn reward while solving the 
assigned tasks. 
We also investigated the MHCF framework’s ability to exploit the 
student learning to improve the total rewards earned over the en-
tire set of tasks.  The results show that over time: (1) the standard 
deviation of the rewards earned by the student coalitions de-
creased (slope = −0.22, 𝑝 < 0.01) and (2) the reward earned per 
interaction increased (slope = 1.56, 𝑝 < 0.01).  The reward (i.e., 
the score) of a student is proportional to the sum of (1) the diffi-
culty of the subtask and (2) the solution quality achieved by the 
students who are solving it.  Since the student agents in our im-
plementation try to improve the total reward earned over the entire 
set of tasks, initially, some of the coalitions will contain students 
who may fail to attain high solution quality for the subtasks since 
they or their peers would have low ability.  As a result, the mem-
bers of those coalitions would have low rewards yielding (1) 
higher standard deviation of rewards and (2) low reward per inte-
raction value for the entire classroom respectively. However, that 
tradeoff would improve the total reward earned by the entire 
classroom for future tasks since the members of those coalitions 
have improved their abilities and can now utilize that learned skill 
to earn better rewards.  As a result, there would be fewer coali-
tions with low rewards and (1) the standard deviation of the 
earned reward would decrease and (2) the reward gain per interac-
tion would increase, as indicated by the observed slopes above.   
To further validate the MHCF framework’s ability of improving 
the total reward over time, we have replicated the same experi-
ment with randomly formed coalitions.  The statistically signifi-
cant results of our comparison experiment shows that (1) MHCF-
formed coalitions earn more rewards (𝑝 < 0.01) over time, (2) 
MHCF-formed coalitions reduce the standard deviation of the 
earned reward faster (slope −0.22 vs. 0.01, 𝑝 < 0.01), and (3) 
MHCF-formed coalitions improve the reward per interaction 
faster (slope 1.56 vs. −1.96,𝑝 < 0.01).   
In summary, our analysis of the results indicate that the MHCF 
framework is able to form student coalitions in such a way that the 
members of those coalitions achieve better rewards over time 
while solving the current task.  Further, the MHCF framework is 
able to exploit the learning ability of the participating students and 
improve their total reward earned over a period of time.   
6. RELATED WORK 
Although most the typical multiagent coalition formation frame-
works do not explicitly discuss human coalition formation prob-
lems, some of the researchers have discussed forming coalitions in 
the real-world uncertain environments which is relevant to the 
human coalition formation problem environment.  Chalkiadakis 
and Boutilier [1] describe a negotiation-based algorithm and 
Bayesian learning to form agent coalitions in uncertain environ-
ments.  Their research is very relevant to ours since it describes 
the coalition formation process where agents lack sufficient know-
ledge of the capabilities of their partner agents and the value of 
the coalitions is not known with certainty.  In another research, 
Kraus, Shehory, and Taase [5] describe a negotiation-based coali-
tion formation protocol for forming agent coalitions in real world 
uncertain environments.  In their research, agents use simple heu-
ristics to negotiate coalitions that allows them to solve complex 
tasks in the business domain under time constraints.  However, the 
coalition formation methods described these research approaches 
are designed to be used in scenarios where the principal actors 
(i.e., who solve the tasks) are agents and these methodologies do 
not address the unique aspects of the human coalition formation 
problem.  For example, these coalition formation methodologies 
are not designed to exploit the behavioral improvement of the 
coalition members and coalition formation methodologies do not 
calculate the long-term rewards as a function of the environment 
both of which are common in human coalitions.  Finally, these 
coalition formation methods do not consider the agent support to 
the actors while forming the coalitions which could be an impor-
tant factor in determining the short-term and long-term rewards in 
a human coalition formation problem. 
7. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we have described the design and implementation of 
MHCF, a multiagent framework that considers comprehensively 
(1) the roles of coalition structures and agent-provided scaffolding 
in facilitating human learning, and (2) the tradeoffs between max-
imizing current-task and future-tasks rewards taking into account 
environment openness and human changes, to form human coali-
tions.  In our MHCF design, each human user is assigned a user 
agent that conducts negotiations and cooperative agent learning to 
form human coalitions. To validate the MHCF framework, we 
have used it to form coalitions in SimCoL, an environment that 
simulates the collaborative learning activities of students.  Our 
results show that the agents in the MHCF framework can: (1) 
learn to form better coalitions over time and (2) enable the stu-
dents to earn better rewards for a given set of tasks.   
The problem of forming human coalitions is a relatively new re-
search arena and there are a lot of open issues to address.  Our 
future work includes: (1) improving the MHCF framework by 
implementing adaptive scaffolding and incorporating the cost of 
scaffolding and (2) conducting a large-scale real-world classroom 
experiment with the MHCF framework.   
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